

PROPOSAL ON THE NEW DIRECTORS' REMUNERATION POLICY OF THE COMPANY FOR 2025-2027

I. JUSTIFICATION OF THE PROPOSAL

The General Shareholders' Meeting of Logista Integral, S.A. (hereinafter, indistinctly, "Logista" or "the Company"), held on 2 February 2024, approved the Remuneration Policy 2024-2026, in force until this date. This policy was examined and reported on by the Appointments and Remuneration Committee at its meeting of 14 December 2023, prior to the Board's resolution to propose it to the General Shareholders' Meeting held in February 2024, where it was finally approved.

This policy was reviewed with external advice from Georgeson, with a view to further aligning the Directors' remuneration framework with best market practices.

Due to the resignation of the Director Secretary, who has been replaced by an independent Director position, a new wording of the current policy is proposed to accommodate the new composition of the Board of Directors, and also to further improve the clarity and transparency of our remuneration framework. This new text therefore incorporates the elimination of the remuneration terms of the Secretary Director and the update of the Director's remuneration in their capacity as such. The sole position of Executive Director is currently that of the Chief Executive Officer.

In view of the foregoing, a new Logista Directors' Remuneration Policy 2025-2027 (the "Remuneration Policy 2025-2027" or the "Policy 2025-2027"), as proposed by the Nomination and Remuneration Committee ("ARC"), is hereby submitted to the Shareholders for their consideration. The new Policy 2025-2027, which will enter into force and will supersede the policy currently in force as from the date of its approval by the General Shareholders' Meeting, will remain in force until the third anniversary of such date. It should also be noted that the executive director is not a member of the aforementioned ARC, and therefore has not participated in the deliberation and voting on the issues contained therein.



II. DIRECTORS' REMUNERATION POLICY PROPOSAL

1. General Principles of the Directors' Remuneration Policy

The Remuneration Policy is aimed at attracting, retaining and motivating the best professionals, while at the same time establishing a stable, permanent link between remuneration, results and shareholder interests, thus achieving the long-term objectives of the Group.

In addition, the Company promotes compliance with the principles and recommendations of the Code of Good Governance¹, the best market practices and the guidelines of shareholders and investors.

In this regard, the general principles and fundamentals on which the Remuneration Policy is based are the following:

		Executive Directors	Non- executive Directors
Linkage to business strategy, interests and long-term sustainability	It will contribute to the business strategy and to the long-term interests and sustainability of the Company, in particular, creating value for the shareholder in a sustainable way over time.	✓	
Connection between remuneration and results ("pay for performance")	Establishing a direct link with the achievement of strategic objectives (financial and non-financial), concrete, quantifiable and aligned with the Business Plan ² , that focus on the creation of sustainable value. Setting a balanced compensation mix, with a significant weighting of the remuneration linked to results, in particular, in the long term.	√	
Risk control	The variable remuneration is not guaranteed, so it is possible not to pay this component if certain objectives are not achieved and it is subject to certain adjustment mechanisms (malus and clawback clauses) that allow it to be sufficiently flexible. The weighting of fixed and variable elements in the compensation mix allows for adequate risk management.	✓	
Competitiveness	By establishing a compensation framework that is aligned with best market practices and that is competitive in relation to other comparable companies, allowing attracting and retaining the best professionals.	✓	✓
Fairness and suitability	Adequately compensate according to the professional career, experience, qualification, dedication and level of responsibility, without constituting an obstacle to their duty of loyalty and the independence of judgment of the directors in their capacity as such.	✓	✓
Non-discrimination ("Equal Pay")	Policies and practices ensure that criteria involving discrimination based on sex, age, culture, religion or race are not applied.	✓	✓
Transparency	The Company is committed to transparency and communication with all its stakeholders, including shareholders, employees and analysts, so that the Policy can be easily understood by all stakeholders.	✓	✓

Code of good governance of the listed companies in its version approved by the council of the National Securities Market Commission in June 2020 ("Code of Good Governance").

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Business Plan or Budget of the Group ("Business Plan").

2. <u>Decision-making process for the determination, review and application of the Policy</u> and measures to manage conflicts of interest

2.1 The Appointments and Remunerations Committee

The Appointments and Remunerations Committee, whose functions are established in Article 18 of the Corporate Bylaws and Article 17 of the Board of Directors' Regulations, plays a fundamental role in the definition of the Logista Remuneration Policy and in the development and application of its components.

In the area of remuneration, the ARC periodically reviews and ensures compliance with the Remuneration Policy. For this purpose, the ARC meets periodically, convened by its President, or when two of its members request it.

The ARC ensures the adequacy of the individual remunerations of the Directors with the best practices of the market and good governance and takes into account the remunerative and labor conditions of the employees of Logista as a whole. For this purpose, it also takes into account comparative data of other companies.

The ARC can be assisted by independent external consultants in matters of remuneration. These advisors can provide advice, market trends and comparative data whenever necessary. Other internal departments or independent third parties may also assist the ARC to measure the level of achievement of the objectives established in the variable remuneration systems.

2.2 The Board of Directors

The Board approves, at the proposal of the ARC, the Remuneration Policy, including long-term incentives linked to the value of the share before its elevation to the General Shareholders Meeting. It also approves the commercial contract of the executive Directors with the Company, where all the remunerative concepts are included.

In addition, the Board of Directors, at the ARC's proposal, periodically adopts and reviews the general principles of the Policy, and will be responsible for supervising its application.

2.3 The Audit, Control and Sustainability Committee

The Audit and Control Committee of Logista participates in the decision-making process in relation to the variable remuneration of executive Directors by supervising the economic-financial information that serves as the basis for calculating the level of achievement of the objectives set for the purpose of receiving said remuneration.

2.4 The General Shareholders Meeting

The General Shareholders' Meeting, within the framework of the bylaws, approves the Remuneration Policy proposed by the Board, at least, every three years, as a separate point from the agenda.

It also issues an advisory vote on the Directors Annual Remuneration Report, where, among other items, the remunerations accrued during the last fiscal year are detailed.

2.5 Measures aimed at preventing or managing conflicts of interest

In accordance with the provisions of Article 32 of the Board of Directors' Regulations, the Directors must observe the obligations established in the current legislation on conflicts of interest, in particular, adopting the necessary measures to avoid situations in which their interests, whether acting on their own behalf or on behalf of others, may enter into conflict with the social interest and with their obligations to Logista or any other companies of its Group.

The Directors must communicate any situation of conflict, direct or indirect, that he/she or the persons related to him/herself may have with the interest of Logista or the companies of the Logista's Group.

Likewise, they must communicate the direct or indirect participation, that they or their related persons, have in the capital of a company with the same, analogous or related type of activity to that of the Company, as well as the positions or functions that they exercise in such companies. They must also communicate the deployment on their own interest or in the interest of others of the same, analogous or similar activity to that of the Company's purpose.

In any case, the conflict situations incurred by the Directors shall be subject to information in the Annual Report of Corporate Governance and in the annual report.

3. Remuneration Policy of the Directors in their capacity as such

3.1 Characteristics and considerations for determining Directors remuneration in their capacity as such

The remuneration of Board Members in their capacity as such shall be determined taking into consideration the provisions of (i) the regulations applicable to the capital companies and, in particular, to the listed corporations contained in the LSC; (ii) the Corporate Bylaws; (iii) this Policy; (iv) the agreements adopted by the General Shareholders' Meeting; and (v) the Board of Directors' Regulations.

In line with the principles governing this Policy, the remuneration of the Directors of the Company in their capacity as such offers a competitive remunerative package, in accordance with the dedication, qualification and responsibility of each Board Members, without constituting an obstacle to their duty of loyalty and their independence of judgment. It is aimed at allowing the Company to access the best talent and encourage its retention.


Likewise, Director's remuneration in their capacity as such must be aligned with best corporate governance standards, the guidelines of investors and market circumstances, in view of the characteristics and activity of the Group.

In this sense, Directors in their capacity as such do not receive variable remuneration, either in cash or in shares, or any long-term remuneration for pension plans, retirement systems or other welfare systems, in line with the recommendations of the Code of Good Governance.

3.2 Elements of the remuneration system of the Directors in their capacity as such

The determination of the remuneration of each Director, in his/her capacity as such, corresponds to the Board of Directors that will take into account, for this purpose, the functions and responsibilities attributed to each Director, the membership in Board Committees, and the other objective circumstances that maybe considered relevant.

The remuneration of the Directors in their capacity as such consists of:



However, it is left to the discretion of the Board of Directors to address other circumstances, that must be objective and applied in a transparent manner, to determine the remuneration of the Directors in their capacity as such, within the maximum limit and the compensation system established in this Policy.

The Directors living in a location other than the one in which the meetings of the Board or of the Committees are held, shall have the right to reimbursement of the duly justified expenses of transport, maintenance and accommodation that they incur in while travelling to attend the aforementioned meetings.

The amounts allocated to this remuneration are as follows:

Fixed monthly cash allowance:	
President of the Board	30.600 €
Director	5.400 €
Chairman of the Appointments and Remuneration Committee	1.700 €
Chairman of the Audit, Control and Sustainability Committee	1.800 €

Per diem for attendance at meetin meeting):	ngs (per
Board of Directors	2.917 €
Appointments and Remuneration Committee	1.061 €
Audit, Control and Sustainability Committee	1.714 €

In view of the role of the President of the Board, with the specific functions defined in its Regulations, and the work of institutional representation that this position always entails in practice, the compensation of this role will be the necessary to remunerate the commitment, qualification and responsibility of this position, without compromising its independence.

On the other hand, Directors, in their capacity as such, will be included in the civil liability policies for directors contracted by the Group.

The maximum amount of remuneration that the Company's Directors as a whole may annually receive in their capacity as such shall not exceed the amount of €1,600,000. This amount will continue to be applicable during the term of this Policy, unless the General Shareholders' Meeting decides to modify it in the future.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, Directors may waive the right to receive the remuneration that corresponds to them in accordance with the provisions of this Policy.

4. Remuneration Policy for executive Directors

4.1 Characteristics of the Remuneration Policy for the performance of executive functions

Directors remuneration for deployment of the executive functions of the Company will be determined taking into consideration the provisions of (i) the regulations applicable to the capital companies and, in particular, to the listed corporations contained in the LSC; (ii) the Corporate Bylaws; (iii) this Remuneration Policy; (iv) the agreements adopted by the General Shareholders' Meeting; (v) their corresponding contracts; (vi) the Remuneration Policy of the Senior Management of the Group; and (vii) the objectives established in the Business Plan.


In accordance with the provisions of the Bylaws of the Company and the Board of Directors' Regulations, the receipt of remuneration for the performance of executive functions is independent and fully compatible with the receipt by the Director of remunerations in his/her capacity as such.

The remuneration system of executive Directors, in line with the principles of the Policy, must meet the following characteristics:

- It will present a balanced and efficient relationship between the fixed components and the variable components.
- The variable remuneration will have a short-term component and a long-term component.
- The compensation system will be compatible with adequate and effective risk management and with the Company's long-term business strategy and interests, and will be aimed at promoting the Company's long-term profitability and sustainability.
- It will take into account market trends and the principles and recommendations of good governance, as well as the guidelines of shareholders and investors.

4.2 Elements of the remuneration system for the performance of executive functions

Article 14 of the Corporate Bylaws and Articles 28 of the Board of Directors' Regulations establish that the remuneration system of executive Directors may include the following elements, without prejudice to the remuneration that the latter receive for their condition as Directors:



4.3 Compensation mix

The purpose of the remuneration scheme is to establish a balanced and effective relationship between the fixed and variable components. Executive Directors have a fully flexible variable remuneration system that prevents them from receiving any amount for this concept in the event that the minimum achievement thresholds are not met.

The graphs show several examples of the possible future total remuneration of the executive Directors, in accordance with this Remuneration Policy. The possible results and premises on which they are based are indicated in the table.


The long-term variable remuneration in shares is the most significant component of the CEO remuneration; in the maximum scenario, the long-term remuneration in shares can represent 49% of his total remuneration.


CEO

Fixed Remuneration*	All scenarios	€882,904
Short-term variable remuneration (annual)	Minimum	There is no short-term variable remuneration settlement as the minimum level of achievement of objectives was not reached.
	Target	100% of the Incentive (150% of the Fixed Remuneration)
	Maximum	115% of the Incentive (172.50% of the Fixed Remuneration)
Long-term	Minimum	There is no liquidation of long-term variable remuneration as the minimum level of achievement of objectives was not reached.
variable remuneration (multi-annual) —	Target	100% of the Incentive (225% of the Fixed Remuneration)
	Maximum	116.25% of the Incentive (261.56% of the Fixed Remuneration)

^{*} Welfare systems and remuneration in kind have not been included for these purposes.







- ■Fixed Remuneration
- Short-term variable Remuneration (annual)
- Long-term variable Remuneration (multi-annual)

4.4 Fixed Remuneration

The fixed remuneration will adequately compensate the level of responsibility of the executive Directors within the Group, the positions they hold and their professional experience, ensuring its competitiveness with respect to that applied in comparable entities, in order to attract and retain the best professionals.

The annual fixed remunerations corresponding to the CEO is as follows:

Position	Fixed Remuneration
CEO	€900,562

For its determination and possible updates, the specific characteristics of each position and the required dedication, as well as the market analyses prepared by specialized independent consultants, will be taken into account, in addition to the criteria set forth above.

The determination of the salary update of the fixed remuneration of the Directors will be aligned with that of the rest of the senior management, as well as those positions within the group whose update is based on a merit increase.

Based on the above, and without prejudice to the powers of the General Shareholders' Meeting, the Board of Directors, after the proposal of the ARC, will be able to review and, where applicable, update the amount of the fixed compensation for the performance of executive functions.

Where appropriate, these updates will be included in the Annual Remuneration Report of Directors that will be submitted to a consultative vote of the General Meeting of Shareholders.

4.5 Variable remuneration

The variable remuneration to be received for the performance of executive functions will have (i) a short-term component (annual) that will be paid in cash, and (ii) a long-term component (multi-annual), which will be settled through the delivery of Company's shares. Both remunerations will be subject to the achievement of specific, quantifiable objectives directly aligned with the interests of the Company, the shareholders and other stakeholders, to the extent that they contribute to the generation of value for the Company.

A) Short-term variable remuneration (annual)

The executive Directors may participate in the Group's general annual variable remuneration that has the purpose of rewarding the achievement of a combination of business financial objectives, individual contribution objectives and other objectives based on predetermined, specific, quantifiable sustainability, environmental, social or governance criteria, aligned with the social interest and strategic objectives of the Business Plan.

The basis of this remuneration is determined by taking into account the content of the functions associated with the position, the information on remuneration of comparable listed companies, as well as the information from market studies.

The amounts to be granted to executive Directors under the annual variable remuneration are as follows:

- Target amount (reached in case of fulfillment of 100% of the pre-established objectives):
 - CEO: 150% of the Fixed Remuneration.

Maximum amount:

 CEO: 172.50% of the Fixed Remuneration (in the event of reaching a maximum degree of achievement of the incentive that amounts to 115%, based on a maximum fulfillment of objectives).

The short-term variable remuneration is not guaranteed, as there are minimum thresholds that gives the right to receive variable remuneration. Each of the objectives that weight in the incentive calculation presents a minimum degree of achievement below which annual variable remuneration does not accrue, and this is applied in proportion to the weight of such specific objective with respect to the total. Over those thresholds, different achievement scenarios may occur that would entail different achievement degrees of the incentive, until reaching the maximum indicated above, which implies maximum achievement of each of the specific objective.

The objectives to which the short-term variable remuneration is linked will be (i) of a concrete economic-financial nature, quantifiable, aligned with social interest, and the Group's strategic plans; (ii) will include metrics that assess the level of personal contribution of the executive



Director based on the fulfillment of individual value creation objectives, and (iii) other types of objectives that promote the maintenance of good practices linked to the corporate social responsibility of the Company, governance or sustainability.

These objectives will be aligned with those applicable to the rest of the management and employees of the Group.

In this regard, the objectives and weightings applicable to executive Directors are detailed below:

Objectives		CEO
Business Objectives	Operating Profit	60%
	Working Capital	15%
Individual Objectives	Individual Contribution	15%
	Sustainabililty *	10%

No significant variations are expected during the term of the Policy. In any case, the short-term variable remuneration may be reviewed in view of the functions carried out by each of the executive Directors, their development and consolidation in the position, the strategic priorities of the Company and its needs and business situation and other factors considered appropriate by the ARC. In the event that a modification is proposed by the ARC, the Board of Directors must approve this adjustment, and submit it to the approval of the General Meeting of shareholders

The degree of achievement of the proposed objectives will be determined annually by the Board of Directors, at the proposal of the Appointments and Remunerations Committee, once the annual accounts of the Company have been audited, taking into account, where appropriate, the possible exceptions that could be formulated in order to reduce the amount of the variable remunerations. The breakdown of the short-term variable remuneration settlement corresponding to each fiscal year will be included in the corresponding Annual Remuneration Report of Directors.

The settlement of the annual variable remuneration will be made in full in cash.

B) Long-term variable remuneration (multi-annual)

The purpose of this remuneration element, in line with the best remuneration practices, is to establish a multi-year remuneration framework that allows the remuneration of executive Directors to be linked to the interests and the creation of long-term shareholder value and that allows a sustainable achievement of the strategic objectives included in the Business Plan.

The executive Directors will participate in long-term incentive plans in which members of senior management and certain employees of the Group also participate.

These plans will have a minimum duration of three years, and the actions that correspond to the executive Directors will only be delivered, if applicable, three years after the launch of the corresponding plan (the "Consolidation Period"). The plans may be launched in an overlapping manner over time.

With respect to the amount of the long-term variable remuneration, the maximum limits corresponding to the executive Directors, determined according to (i) the content of the functions


associated with the position, (ii) the information on remuneration of listed companies comparable to the Company, as well as (iii) the information from the market studies, will be:

- **CEO**: the maximum total number of shares to be recognized as initial incentive will be equivalent to 225% of the Fixed Remuneration. This will constitute the target amount *based* on a 100% degree of achievement.

A minimum threshold will be established, below which no long-term variable remuneration will accrue and also a maximum limit.

The number of shares that actually accrue will be conditioned upon (i) the executive Director maintaining an employment or commercial relationship with the Company throughout the Consolidation Period, notwithstanding that, attending to the concurrent circumstances in each case, the Board of Directors may agree on the corresponding proration in the event of early termination, and (ii) to the degree of achievement of the objectives, that will be linked to issues related to the generation of long-term value for the Company and its shareholders, as well as operating and financial criteria linked to the performance of the Company during the duration of the plans and/or sustainability issues, governance or corporate social responsibility.

The relative objectives and weights included in the last long-term remuneration plan approved by the Company, in force on the date of approval of this Policy, are the following:



The objectives of sustainability, governance or corporate social responsibility may include metrics relating to issues of environmental sustainability, health and safety, etc.

Among the objectives of comparative profitability, linked to the generation of value for the Company and its shareholders, metrics such as the total return on shareholders compared (CSR) to the profitability of a given "Reference Group" will be included which will be made up of a group of companies, selected in the context of the Company's activities, its main customers and competitors with similar characteristics (peer group), and relevant stock indices given the characteristics of the Company. It is the responsibility of the Board of Directors to set the "Reference Group".

Additionally, the objectives linked to operating and financial criteria will include metrics such as the Adjusted EBIT or other similar ones.

The degree of achievement of the proposed objectives will be determined by the Board of Directors, at the proposal of the Appointments and Remunerations Committee, once the annual accounts of the Company have been audited, taking into account, where appropriate, the possible exceptions that could be formulated to reduce the amount of the variable remunerations. Likewise, the sustainability objectives will be linked to the fulfillment of certain sustainability objective parameters.

The liquidation of the long-term variable remuneration will be made in shares of the Company. The breakdown of the liquidation of the long-term variable remuneration will be included in the corresponding Annual Remuneration Report of Directors.

The regulation of the previous remuneration policy will continue to apply in relation to the long-term incentive plans pending of consolidation.

C) Obligation to maintain the shares of the Company

The incentive plans approved by the Company shall include the obligation to maintain ownership of the shares received by the Executive Directors as a result of their participation in long-term deferred variable remuneration plans until reaching a number of shares equivalent to twice their annual fixed remuneration. Said number of shares may not be transferred until the end of their position.

Board Members who have not reached the minimum number of shares required, may not sell consolidated shares and shares delivered under one of the Logista incentive plans, except those that must be transmitted to deal with taxes.

D) Ex-post adjustments of variable remuneration: "malus" and "clawback" clauses

In order to align the variable remuneration of the executive Directors with the recommendations of the Code of Good Governance, the payment of the short and long variable remuneration may be reduced in whole or in part (malus clause), or the return of all or part of the remuneration already paid during the two years maybe requested (clawback clause), whenever any of the following circumstances occur:

- When the settlement and payment of the variable remuneration has totally or partially occurred based on information whose falsehood or serious inaccuracy is clearly demonstrated a posteriori.
- When external auditors consider necessary a material reformulation of the accounts with a relevant negative impact of the Group's financial statements, except when such reformulation is a consequence of the accounting regulations.
- In the event that the executive Director in question has been penalized for a serious breach of the Law or the Code of Conduct and other applicable internal regulations, provided that this breach has harmed the image and reputation of the Logista Group or has harmed the perception thereof by the markets, customers, suppliers, or regulators, among others.

The Board of Directors, at the proposal of the Appointments and Remunerations Committee, will determine, where appropriate, whether the circumstances that cause the application of the aforementioned clauses have occurred and that the variable remuneration, where appropriate, must be canceled or returned to the Company or companies of the Group.

4.6 Social Welfare

Directors who perform executive functions will participate in the Employment Pension Plan of Logista. They will also participate in the Social Welfare Plan for Directors, in which the Group makes contributions calculated as a percentage of the Fixed Remuneration (in the case of the executive Directors, as resulting from their respective contracts regardless of the amount they receive for their belonging and attendance to the Board of Directors) and the annual variable remuneration of each Director.

From the fiscal year in which this policy takes effects and thereafter, contributions of up to a maximum of 20% of such fixed salary and variable remuneration may be made.

4.7 Long-term savings systems

It is a deferred compensation plan for executive Directors and Senior Managers of Logista Group.

This plan establishes an extraordinary deferred remuneration that will only be effective when the termination of the executive Director occurs by mutual agreement with the Company when reaching a certain age, therefore there are no consolidated rights.

The receipt of these amounts will include the acceptance of a contractual non-competition agreement of 12 months.

The receipt of such amounts will be incompatible with the collection of any compensation that the Director may be entitled to receive as a result of the termination of his/her relationship with the Company and, in any case, in compliance with Recommendation 64 of the Code of Good Governance, the total amount of the extraordinary deferred remuneration shall not exceed the equivalent of two years of the total annual remuneration of the executive Director at the time of accrual of said remuneration.

For the coverage of this extraordinary remuneration, the Company will annually make contributions to a collective savings insurance, of which the Company itself is the policyholder and Beneficiary. These contributions will be 20% of the annual fixed remuneration and the target annual variable remuneration that may correspond to the executive Director in each fiscal year.

There is currently no Executive Director position included in the Plan.

4.8 Remuneration in kind

Executive Directors may, as part of their payments in kind, have the following benefits that will be established according to market practices and comparable peer group:

- company vehicle;
- a family health care insurance;
- a life insurance with death and disability coverage;
- other non-material benefits aligned with those perceived by senior management.

4.9 Civil liability insurance

Directors will also be included in the civil liability policy that covers the Managers of the Group, with regard to liabilities arising from the exercise of executive functions

5. Main conditions of the executive Directors' contracts

Duration	The contracts of the executive Directors will have an indefinite duration.
Notice	In relation to the CEO, the notice period will be twelve months in the event of termination by unilateral decision of the Company or the CEO.
Compensation	In accordance with the provisions of Article 14 of the Corporate Bylaws, the executive Directors may have the right to collect compensation equivalent to the fixed and variable annual remuneration that, at the time of termination, received as executive Directors in the following cases: (i) unjustified unilateral



	termination of the contract by the Logista Group, (ii) serious breach of the obligations contracted by the Logista Group in the corresponding service provision contract; (iii) when, in the case of the CEO, is no longer the sole CEO; or (iv), if there is a change of control in the shareholding of Logista. In the event that Directors are invited to the deferred Remuneration Plan referred to in section 4.7 above, will be entitled, in the event of retirement at the agreed age, to receive gross compensation for an amount equivalent to the greater of the following two: (i) the amount resulting from adding the annual amount of the fixed remuneration and the target annual variable remuneration corresponding to the fiscal year in which the termination of the contract occurs; or (ii) the amounts accumulated on the date on which the termination of the contract occurs in the long-term savings system established in section 4.7 above. In both cases, such compensation shall not exceed the equivalent of two years of the total annual remuneration of the executive Director at the time of accrual of such remuneration.
Confidentiality	The contract will include a confidentiality and business secrecy clause.
Non-competition	The contract for the CEO includes a post-contractual non-competition agreement of 12 months. This agreement will be remunerated, with the equivalent to the fixed and variable annual remuneration that, as a result of the executive functions that he performs, the CEO would receive on the date of termination of its contract.
Exclusivity	During the exercise of their position, executive Directors may not provide services, either on their own behalf or on behalf of others, or enter into labor, commercial or civil contracts for the provision of services with other companies or entities, unless expressly authorized by the Board of Directors.

6. <u>Incorporation of new Directors</u>

In the event that new members are incorporated to the Board of Directors during the term of this Policy, the remuneration system described in this Policy shall apply to them.

It will also apply to any executive Director who joins the Company during the term of this Remuneration Policy, whereas, when determining the elements of the remuneration system, the functions attributed, the responsibilities assumed, the professional experience, the market remuneration of that position and any other relevant aspect will be taken into account by the ARC and the Board, and such elements will be duly reflected in the corresponding contract to be signed between the Company and the new executive Director.

In any case, the remuneration received by the new Board Members who join the Company will be detailed in the Annual Remuneration Report of Directors, which will be annually submitted to an advisory vote of the General Shareholders' Meeting.

7. Consideration of the remuneration and employment conditions of the rest of the Company's employees

The remuneration policy applicable to Company employees has been taken into account for the establishment of the remuneration conditions of the executive Directors, described in this Policy.

The remuneration system of the executive Directors is aligned with that of the rest of the employees of the Company, to the extent that it seeks to compensate the value that they provide to Logista, sharing the same principles, elements that make up the remuneration and common objectives.

For the establishment of the Directors remuneration model and in order to compare it with that of the rest of the employees, Logista uses the salary reference of the Willis Towers Watson studies. Such methodology is used for leveling companies and positions at all levels of the organization to determine the remuneration policies and frameworks, as well as to make valid and efficient comparisons with the market and with those companies considered to be comparative references of the Group.

Therefore, the model of the remuneration policy of the executive Directors is identical to that used to define the Senior Management Remuneration Policy, as well as the remuneration model of the rest of the employees of Logista, all of them being of a similar nature, and only reflect the quantitative differences derived from the market according to the role performed and the professional experience of the executive Directors.

8. Alignment with strategy, interests and long-term sustainability

The Remuneration Policy has the following characteristics that guarantee its coherence and that of its variable remuneration elements, with the business strategy, interests and long-term sustainability of Logista.

- A. The design of the Remuneration Policy is aligned with the Company's business strategy and aimed at obtaining long-term results:
 - The remuneration of the executive Directors includes among its components: (i) a fixed remuneration, (ii) a short-term variable remuneration and (iii) a long-term variable remuneration. In a scenario of standard achievement of the objectives, this long-term element will have, at least, a weight of 47% for the CEO.
 - The annual variable remuneration is linked, among others, to objectives of a concrete economicfinancial nature, quantifiable, and aligned with the interests of the shareholders and the Logista strategy. The non-financial objectives have a maximum weight of 25% in the case of the CEO.
 - The long-term variable remuneration is enrolled in a multiannual framework to ensure that the evaluation process is based on long-term results and that it takes into account the underlying business cycle of the Group. This multi-year variable remuneration is structured around a mechanism of delivery of shares of the Company deferred in the time articulated through plans of delivery of shares structured in three overlapping cycles of three years each, so that the interests of the executive Directors are aligned with those of the shareholders.
 - The long-term remuneration plans are linked to objectives related to the generation of long-term value for the Company and its shareholders, as well as to criteria of an operational and financial nature linked to the performance of the Company during the duration of the plans and/or issues of sustainability, governance or corporate social responsibility, the latter having a maximum weight of 10% of the whole.
 - B. Adequate balance between the fixed and variable components of remuneration: executive Directors have a variable remuneration system that is not guaranteed and is totally flexible, so that they may not receive any amount for this item in the event that the minimum achievement thresholds are not reached. The percentage of short- and long-term variable remuneration may be considerable in the event of maximum achievement of the objectives. In any case, said percentage with respect to the maximum total remuneration (considering for these purposes the

maximum amount of the short-term variable remuneration and the long-term variable remuneration) would not exceed 81% for the CEO.

In addition, the following measures allow to reduce exposure to excessive risks and reinforce the alignment of the Company's strategy, interests, objectives and long-term values:

- The Appointments and Remunerations Committee shall have the function of periodically reviewing and ensuring compliance with the Remuneration Policy.
- The payment of the variable remuneration only occurs after the date of preparation and audit of the corresponding annual accounts and after having been able to determine the degree of achievement of the operational and financial objectives.
- There is no guaranteed variable remuneration.
- The Remuneration Policy includes the possibility of (i) canceling, in whole or in part, the payment of variable remuneration (malus clause), and (ii) requiring the return of all or part of the remuneration already paid during the two years following the liquidation and payment of variable remuneration both in the short term and in the long term (clawback clause).
- Obligation to maintain the shares of the Company: the executive Directors have the obligation to maintain ownership of the shares they receive as a result of their participation in long-term deferred variable remuneration plans until reaching a number of shares equivalent to twice their annual fixed remuneration. Said number of shares may not be sold until the end of his/her term of office.

9. Maximum amount of Directors' remuneration

The remuneration that can be annually received by all the Company's Directors as a whole will be limited to an amount resulting from adding:

- a) the amount of 1,600,000 euros for all Directors, in their capacity as such; and
- b) the total figure resulting from the sum of the maximum amounts for all concepts included in the present Policy for the Executive Directors.

10. Term of the Remuneration Policy

This Remuneration Policy will enter into force and void the Policy currently in force from the date of approval by the General Meeting of Shareholders and will remain in force until the third anniversary of said date, except for the modifications, adaptations, updates or substitutions that are agreed at any time, which will be submitted for approval before the General Meeting of Shareholders of the Company.

Madrid, on the 12nd of December of 2024

The Deputy Secretary of the Board of Directors,

Ms. Ainhoa Anuncibay Abad